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I  propose  spending  the  time alloted to  me 
morning  on  the subject of the Commission's  recent proposals 
for  the adjustment of the European  Communities  Comnon  Agri-
cultural Policy,  since  I  get the very strong impression that 
a  number  of people,  not  a  hundred miles  from  this hall,  hold 
the view that these proposals  could adversely affect "the 
future of  US  agricultural trade"  - the  topic  for  this 
morning's  session. 
The  framework  of this package of measures  was  made 
known  at the  end of July since when it has  been  fleshed out 
by  a  number  of more  precise,  more  detailed proposals. 
Regrettably,  there  seems  to  me  to have  been  a  great deal of 
misunderstanding over these proposals  - one might even  say 
,. 
misrepresentation  - to the extent that they are  being portrayed 
as  a  serious  threat to the  US  farmer  and  exporter. 
A  great deal of attention has  been paid,  quite under-
standably,  to  the external measures  contained  in the  package 
but rarely,  if at all,  is any mention  made  of the  fact that 
these proposed external measures  form only  a  part,  and  a  small 
part at that,  of  a  much  larger progranune. 
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What  is more,  the alleged effect of these external 
measures  has  been grossly exaggerated.  As  recently as  last 
Thursday,  a  Senate hearing was  told - in all seriousness  -
that the Commission's  proposals  regarding grain substitutes 
and  vegetable oil would,  if adopted,  cost the United States 
5  billion dollars  in lost sales.  I'm sure that no  one  in 
this knowledgeable  audience  would  be  taken  in by  such  an 
extraordinary claim.  But this is not the first occasion on 
which  this  figure  has  been  mentioned  so  I  will return and 
examine it in a  moment. 
It is, of course,  not difficult to appreciate the 
great sensitivity here in the  US  as  regards  agricultural exports 
when  one  takes  into account that 2  acres out of every  5  us  farm 
acres  rely on overseas  sales  - a  significantly higher proportion 
than  that for  the  industrial sector and  that,  for  example,  about 
two  thirds of  US  wheat  production  is  surplus to internal 
requirements  and is consequently dependent on  an  unreliable world 
market  for outlets.  So,  some  concentration on  the external effects 
of our proposals is perhaps  not  too  surprising.  But  I  should like 
to  use  this opportunity for which  I  am  most  grateful  to the organi-
sers of this conference,  to briefly describe  the whole  package  and 
to set the  two  relatively small  elements  concerning  corn  gluten 
feed  and  vegetable oil in their true perspective. 
First, what  are  we  trying to  achieve?  The  main  thrust 
of the  Commission's  proposals is - 3  -
- to limit Community  spending on  farm  support 
- to  adapt our agricultural policy to meet  the 
changed conditions of the mid  80's 
- to discourage  surplus  farm production. 
The  Common  Agricultural  Policy  - more  familiarly  known 
to both its admirers  and  detractors  as  the  CAP  - is one of the 
major  achievements of the  Community.  But,  like anything else in 
this ever changing world,  it cannot,  if it is to survive,  remain 
immutable  and  become  fossilised.  Since its inception  some  two 
decades  ago,  in addition to the  technical  progress  and  productivity 
increases  acknowledged  by  Secretary Block  on  Monday,  fundamental 
structural changes  have  also  taken place.  There  are  now 
approximately  8  million working  on  the  land  compared with  18 
million  20  years  ago.  The  number  of holdings  has  fallen  and  their 
average  size increased to  about  45  acres  - small  by American 
standards,  but double what it was  in Europe  when  the  CAP  started. 
In spite of these  technical  advances  and of  the  support 
afforded  by  the  CAP,  and  contrary to what  is often believed, 
incomes  from  agriculture have  increased more  slowly  than other 
incomes  since 1973.  High  rates of inflation and  divergences  of 
inflation rates between our  10  Member  States have  also created 
problems  for  the  CAP. 
But  in spite of these difficult economic  conditions, 
the  Community  remains  not only the worlds  largest importer of 
food  - taking about one  quarter of total world agricultural 
imports  - but also  the  US  farmers  best customer  - to  the extent 
that we  currently run  a  massive deficit on our transatlantic  agricultural - 4  -
trade of between  6  and  7  billion dollars  - four  times  the deficit 
we  ran  in 1971. 
One  of the principles of our agricultural policy  - just 
as it is in most  other parts of the world  - is to  provide  a 
reasonable  standard of living for our  farmers  - the  descendants 
of men  and  women  who  have  farmed  our  European  soil  for  2000 ,years. 
The  CAP  has,in addition to its economic  role,  an  important social 
function  as well.  It has  also got to  be  set against  a  historic, 
cultural and  environmental  framework.  However,  in providing our 
farmers  with  a  reasonable  standard of living,  the  Community 
cannot merely  sign  a  blank  cheque  with  no  ceiling on  expenditure. 
If Community  agriculture is to  succeed,  the  accent must  be  increasing-
ly placed on  production at competitive prices. 
It is no  secret that the  background  to our proposals  is  -
first,  a  shortage of  funds.  From  1974  to  1979  expenditure on 
supporting agricultural markets  grew at  23  % a  year  - almost  double 
the rate of growth of revenue.  Agricultural expenditure  remained 
fairly stable in the period 1980  to  1982  largely because  prices 
remained  relatively high  on world markets.  But  since  then,  expendi-
ture has  increased sharply  - an  estimated  30  % or thereabouts  is 
expected  for  1983.  So,  the  funds  are getting very  low  - and  the 
Community,  unlike national  governments,  cannot  run  a  budget deficit. 
- second,  advances  in technical progress  and  great  im-
provements  in productivity have  meant  that output has  risen more 
rapidly than  consumption.  Increases  in the  volume  of agricultural 
production have  averaged  between 1.5  % and  2.0  % a  year whilst 
consurnptionhas  only risen by  about  0,5  %. - 5  -
This  is the  sombre  background  to the  tough  programme 
of measures  proposed by  the  Commission  - and which  are  now 
before  the Council of Ministers  - for the rationalisation of 
European  agriculture. 
Consequently,  the Commission  proposes,  in particular, 
to  tighten and  to extend  the application of the guarantee 
threshold  system  to more  products.  Guarantee  thresholds dis-
courage  surplus production  by  putting  a  strict predetermined 
ceiling on  the  amount  of  a  given crop  EC  farmers  may  produce 
without being obliged to contribute  towards  the cost of disposing 
of  the  surplus.  The  Commission  takes  the  view that it is  no~ 
longer  reasonable or possible to provide open  ended  guarantees 
to  farmers  when  market outlets no  longer exist.  The  Community's 
sugar producers  have,  incidentally,  had  to  pay  the  full cost of 
disposing of excess  sugar production  for  the last 2  years.  But 
these measures  will generally be  strengthened  and  extended over 
a  wide  range. 
Milk,  vlhich  accounts  for  about  one  third of the  EC' s  current 
farm price spending,  provides  a  very clear example  of  how  these  new 
measures  are designed  to discourage over-production.  The  Commission 
has  proposed that as  from  1984  milk producers  be  required to pay 
a  supplementary  levy on  the  amount of milk  they  produce  which 
exceeds  101  % of their total 1981  production.  This  supplementary 
levy would  be  equal  to  75  % of our milk  target price.  In addition, 
the  Commission  has  proposed  a  further  4  % levy on all milk  produced 
on  intensive dairy  farms,  together with  the  suspension of  support 
buying  of skimmed milk  powder  from October  to March. - 6  -
Guarantee  thresholds  already apply  to most  grains,  to 
processed  tomatoes,  oilseeds  and  sugar  and  has  already been 
proposed  for dried raisins.  In the  case of grains  and oilseeds, 
the  system would  be  extended  to  cover all the  main  types  of grain 
and  major oilseeds.  This will mean  for  these products  that if 
production exceeds  the  fixed  ceiling,  then  support prices will 
be abated  for  the next marketing year. 
In addition to the  tightening  and  extension of the 
threshold concept,  the  Commission's  proposed  programme  also in-
cludes  a  restrictive price policy  for all agricultural products 
which will take into  account not only the  economic  situation 
of the agricultural industry itself but also the markets  on which 
it depends.  In the case of those products  where  our prices are 
higher  than  those of our principal competitors  - and  here let me 
add  that in many  cases  they are at about  the  same  level  (milk  for 
example)  and  in  some  lower  - the  Commission  proposed  that the efforts 
to narrow this  gap  should be  accelerated.  The  implementation of 
such  a  restrictive price policy could well  mean  reductions  in 
support prices expressed in national currencies. 
A  reduction in  a  number  of production aids  and  premiums 
has  also been  recommended  - on  the  processing of fruit withdrawn 
from  the market  for  example  and  also in the olive oil and  wine 
sectors. 
These  are  some  of the internal measures  envisaged. The  full  range 
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- production quotas  with  severe penalties  for 
exceeding  them 
- extension of threshold  guarantees 
- much  lower price increases  for  farm  products 
(in  some  cases  reductions  in national currencies) 
- prices  for  some  surplus  commodities  to  be  fixed 
for more  than one  marketing year 
- reduced  intervention or support buying 
- and  the discontinuation of  a  number  of aids 
and  premiums 
are all initiatives which will hit the  European  farmer  and 
which will require substantial sacrifices  from  him.  They  have 
not been well  received at home,  and  COPA- the  European  farmer's 
organisation  - has  gone  as  far  as  to  say that they  "would  have 
extremely serious direct and  indirect repercussio;:I,'.;  cr!  all sectors 
of agricultural production and  would  lead to  a  further substantial 
fall  in farmers'  incomes,  which  have  already declined by  about 
20  % in real  terms  since  the  mid  1970's." 
When  we  are  asking our  own  farmers  to  make  real sacri-
fices  and  to  limit their production  - or  as  a  friend of mine 
recently put it "when  we  are  taking the  knife  to our  farmers"  -
the  Commission  believes  that it is not in the  least unreasonable 
for  the Community  to  review its treatment of conpeting  imports 
provided that this is done  strictly in accordance \vith  the inter-
national  trading rules  as  set out  in the  GATT. - 8  -
This,  of course,  brings  me  to the  two  elements of  the 
package  that have  been  given star billing here.  But before doing 
so  I  would  like to turn briefly to  a  remark  made  on  Monday  about 
unfair trading practices  and  which  referred to export subsidies. 
Since  this clearly has  some  relevance  for  US  farm  exports.  For 
me,  unfair implies  something that is against the rules.  However, 
agricultural export subsidies  are  permitted under  GATT  international 
trading rules provided that they  do  not result in  a  member  gaining 
an  inequitable share of the market.  We  maintain that we  have  ob-
served these rules  and  have  thus  not acted unfairly.  From this  I 
can only assume  that it is perhaps  the  rules  themselves  that are 
considered by  some  to be  unfair. 
But  back  to  grain substitutes  and  the  proposed oils and 
fats  tax. 
First,  grain substitutes  and  in particular corn  gluten 
feed  and  citrus pellets.  As  I  said earlier,  we  are aiming  to 
close the  gap  between  our grain prices  and  those of our competitors. 
This  would  have  the effect of making  substitutes less attractive. 
But  until that time  and whilst we  are  implementing  a  guarantee 
threshold  for  grains  and  requiring our cereal  growers  to limit 
their production, it is absolutely essential to have  some  effec-
tive stabilisation of  the  imports  of grain substitutes.  Since, 
as  we  all know,  these products displace  Community  grown  cereals 
in animal  feed  and  have  the effect of  forcing  more  EC  grain onto 
the world market. - 9  -
Our efforts to stabilise our  imports of substitutes is 
not  a  measure  aimed  specifically at the  residues  and  byproducts 
which  come  from  United States processing industries  - yet another 
misconception that has  gained currency.  Substitutes are  imported 
into the  EC  from  a  wide  range of sources,and  arrangements  have 
already been  made  for manioc  and  bran  coming  from  such areas ,as 
South East Asia  and  elsewhere. 
It is now  proposed  to stabilise the  imports  of other 
major  substitutes  - corn gluten  feed  and citrus pellets.  Imports 
of corn gluten  feed  - a  residue  to  a  large extent  from  the  sweetener 
industry which  has  been  able to take  advantage of the  umbrella 
provided by  US  support  arrangemen~ for  sugar  - have  soared  from 
700,000  tons  to  3  million tons  since  1974.  Citrus pellets have 
shown  a  similar rate of increase. 
However,  what is being proposed  for  both corn  gluten  feed 
and  for citrus pellets is not  a  banning  of  imports,  or  even  a  re-
duction  in  imports  but  a  stabilisation of imports  and this only 
after fully carrying out the procecures  provided  for  in the  GATT. 
There will thus  be  no  loss of trade. 
The  proposed tax on  fats  and oils is frequently presented 
here as  a  purely external measure  which will  impair  the duty  free 
access  to the  EC  of  soya beans,  soya meal  and  other oilseeds  and 
oilseed products,  valued at around  4  billion dollars  in 1982. 
This  is just not  so. - -~-~---------------
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First,  the tax would  be  a  non-discriminatory internal 
consumption  tax on all oils and  fats  (excluding butter)  used 
in Europe  for  human  consumption whether  produced  locally or 
imported.  This non-discriminatory treatment is in full  accord 
with international trading rules. 
Second,  imports of  soya  bean  and  soya meal  - or any  ' 
other oil seed  - would  not  be  subjected to  any  import tax or 
levy. 
Third,  it is extremely doubtful whether  the  proposed 
tax would  have  any discernable effect on  the quantities of beans 
(or meal)  imported  since 
a)  the  low rate of tax proposed  combined with  the  reduction 
in butter subsidies is not likely to alter consumption patterns 
of  soya  bean oil and  margarine 
b)  all other vegetable oils,  including olive oil, whether 
obtained  from  imported or domestically  produced  seeds  would  be 
taxed at the  same  flat rate.  This  would  have  a  proportionally 
greater effect on  the  lower priced  oils  - such  as  rape  seed oil. 
Fourth,  the  tax would  not apply  to oils used  for  industrial 
purposes,  nor would it affect any oil which  was  later exported  from 
the  Corrununity. 
Lastly,  soya  beans  and  meal  are  imported very  largely  for 
animal  feed  and  not  for oil production. 
This  brings  me  back  to the  highly misleading figure of 
5  billion dollars worth  of  lost markets  which  was  being  tossed 
around last week.  I  suppose  that this  figure  represents the 
complete  loss of all sales  to  the  EC  of corn  gluten  feed  and - 11 -
citrus pulp,  currently worth  about  $  700  million and  total oil-
seed exports valued at around  $  4  billion.  To  claim that these 
sales would  be lost is to play fast  and  loose with  the  facts 
of the situation - since what  is being proposed,  as  I  have  tried 
to explain,  is  a  stabilisation of substitute imports  - not even  a 
cutting back  and  most certainly not  a  total ban,  as  is implied 
'  when  a  loss of  5  billion is bandied  about plus  a  modest  internal 
consumption  tax on oils and  fats which  should have  no  discernible 
effect on  the EC's  massive  imports  of soya  bean  and  meal.  Neither 
is it very helpful in the  interests of trying to  understand each 
others problems  to present our measures  as  was  done  on  !·1onday  as 
representing  a  potential loss of  3  1/2 billion  $  over  5  years  on 
corn gluten  feed  and citrus pellets alone,  since  - I  repeat  - our 
aim is to stabilise not cut these  imports. 
In  concluding,  Mr.  Chairman,  I  submit  that this major 
package has  not  been  designed  to shift the  burden  of adjusting 
the  CAP  away  from  the  shoulders of our  mvn  farmers  onto  those of 
American  farmers  and exporters.  If you  are  in  any doubt,  I  suggest 
you  ask  any  member  of the European  farmers  delegation  now  in 
Washington  for meetings  with  the  Chamber of Commerce  who  they think 
is being asked  to bear  the burden. 
First,  soyabean  and  soya bean  meal  exports  would  not 
be  affected by  the  proposed  tax on oils  and  fats. 
Second,  stabilisation of corn gluten  feed  and  citrus 
pellet imports will be  carried out in strict conformity with 
GATT  rules  and  in full consultation with the  United States. 
Third,  by  far  the most  substantial and  toughest part of 
this package  is that which affects our  own  farmers  and  which 
calls for  major  sacrifices on  their part. - 12  -
These  measures  which  represent  a  major shift in the 
direction urged  for years  by  United States critics of the 
Common  Agricultural Policy should be welcome  news  for  US 
farmers  and  exporters who  have  long complained about  the 
European  Communities  extravagant  spending  on  agriculture.  They 
should not  reduce  current levels of  US  exports  to  the  Commun~ty. 
On  the contrary,  the  US  farmer  should stand to benefit  from  the 
cutbacks  envisaged in European  farm  production which  competes 
with  US  products  on world markets.  This  always  assumes,  of 
course,  that world  import  demand  picks  up  again  and  is main-
tained,  that some  way  out of the debt problems  of developing 
countries  can  be  found because  this is where  the  potential lies 
and  that the  US  is able  to deal with  the  factor that bears  the 
most  significant responsibility for  the  fall in its exports  -
the  strength of the dollar. 